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Abstract. A blind ring signature scheme is a combination of a ring
signature and a blind signature, which allows not only any member of
a group of signers to sign on a message on behalf of the group without
revealing its identity but also the user who possesses the message to blind
it before sending to the group to be signed. Blind ring signature schemes
are essential components in e-commercial, e-voting etc. In this paper,
we propose the first blind ring signature scheme based on lattices. More
precisely, our proposed scheme is proven to be secure in random oracle
model under the hardness of the short integer solution (SIS) problem.

1

Introduction

Ring signatures were first introduced by Rivest et al. [19] in 2001. In such a
scheme, a signer within a group can form a ring consisting of members in the
group to sign a message on behalf of this ring, without using the secret keys of
those members. A verifier can easily verify that the signature belongs to the ring
using the ring public keys, but cannot reveal the identity of the signer, hence
ensures the anonymity of the signer. Ring signatures can be used for whistle
blowing [19] or anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc groups [5].
They can be used to derive other primitives such as deniable ring authentication [23] or perfect concurrent signatures [24]. Due to flexibility (forming a ring
and signing messages without a group leader) and anonymity property of ring
signatures, there have been recently found interesting applications of ring signatures in cryptocurrencies [21]. Another important kind of protocol that provides
anonymity is blind signatures, first proposed by Chaum [6] for untraceable payments in 1983. Blind signatures allow a person to get a message signed by a
signer without revealing any information about the message to the signer, and
hence which provide the anonymity of the signed message. It therefore makes
blind signatures useful in electronic auctions and electronic voting systems.
In some real-life applications, such as banking, we must make a single ebank system more scalable by supporting many banks and adding some other
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properties like strong anonymity of the signing banks and unlinkability of two
different signatures. It’s therefore necessary to combine blind and ring signatures into one, called blind ring signatures. Clearly, blind ring signatures find
applications in various real-life scenarios that are required a combination of ring
signatures and blind signatures; for examples, multi authority e-voting and distributed e-cash systems. Some examples of such contexts can be found such as
in [9, 12, 26].
With the threat of Shor’s quantum algorithms [22], the research community
has been moving towards to post-quantum cryptography [4] in which latticebased cryptography is one of the most promising candidates due to its high
asymptotic efficiency and parallelism, as well as security under worst-case intractability assumptions. At ASIACRYPT 2009, Lyubashevksy [14] constructed
a lattice-based identification scheme based on ideal lattices, and obtained a signature scheme via Fiat-Shamir’s transformation [7]. Lyubashevsky later improved
to a new signature scheme [15] whose security is based on the SIS problem.
At AfricaCrypt 2013 [1], Aguilar-Melchor et al. proposed the first lattice-based
ring signature scheme. Their construction is based on the scheme of Lyubashevsky [14] over ideal lattices. In 2018, Wang et al. [25] proposed a construction of ring signature from an improved scheme of Lyubashevsky [15]. Regarding blind signatrues, the first scheme based on ideal lattices was introduced by
Rückert [20] at Asiacrypt 2010. Recently, in 2018, Zhang et al. [27] also gave a
new post-quantum construction for blind signature.
In this paper, inspired from the work of Rückert [20] and two aforementioned
works on ring signature [25] and blind signature [27], we construct, for the first
time, a blind ring signature scheme based on lattices. The scheme is provably
secure (i.e., anonymous, blind and one-more unforgeable) in the random oracle
model under the hardness of the SIS problem. Our work exploits the rejection
sampling technique [15] and the trapdoor technique [8], which are fundamental
tools used in lattice-based cryptography.

2

Preliminaries

Notations. For a positive integer l, we write [l] for the set {1, 2, · · · , l}. A column
vector is denoted by small bold letter, e.g., vector v. A matrix is denoted by
bold capital letter, e.g., A. Sometimes we write ai , the i-th component of a
vector a = (a1 , · · · , an ), by a[i]. The notation A[i] is also used to stand for the
i-th column of a matrix A. The Gram-Schmidt orthogonal matrix of a matrix
A will be written as Ã. By notation “x := a” we mean that the variable x is
assigned the value a or x is defined as a. We write a ←$ A to say that a is
sampled uniformly at random from the discrete set A; while if D is a probability
distribution, then a ← D means that a is sampled according to D. In case A is
an algorithm, we write a ← A to say that a is an output of A.
A lattice is a set of all integral combinations of given linearly independent
vectors. Formally, given a matrix A = [a1 , · · · , am ] ∈ Rn×m such
P that ai ’s are
linearly independent, a lattice of basis A is the set L(A) := { i∈[m] ai zi : zi ∈
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Z}. For such a lattice, we call n the dimension of L(A). Take for example, for a
random matrix A ←$ Zn×m , the following are also lattices, called q-ary lattices:
Λ = {v ∈ Zm : v = A> z (mod q) for some z ∈ Zn },
m
n×m
Λ⊥
}.
q (A) = {z ∈ Z : Az = 0 (mod q), where A ←$ Z

(1)

The first minimum of a lattice L is defined as λ1 (L) := minv∈L\{0} kvk. The i-th
minimum of a lattice L of dimension n is denoted by and defined as λi (L) :=
min{r : dim(span(L ∩ Bn (0, r))) ≥ i}, where Bn (0, r) = {x ∈ Rn : kxk ≤ r}.
The γ-SIVP problem is, given a basis A of a lattice L(A), to search for a set of
n linearly independent lattice vectors S ⊂ L(A) such that kSk ≤ γλn (A).
The security of our blind ring signature scheme will be based on the averagecase assumption of the short integer solution (SIS) problem.
, a vector
Definition 1 (SIS Problem). Given a random matrix A ←$ Zn×m
q
u ←$ Znq and a positive real number β, the inhomogeneous small integer problem
ISISq,n,m,β is to find a vector z ∈ Zm \ {0} such that Az = u (mod q) and
kzk ≤ β. In the case u = 0, we have the homogeneous small integer problem,
named SISq,n,m,β .
One can prove that the hardness of SIS and ISIS are essentially equivalent
for typical parameters [18, Chapter 4]. The SISq,n,m,β problem can be seen as
an average-case short vector problem on the q-ary lattice Λ⊥
q (A) defined as in
Equation (1) which requires to find a sufficiently short nonzero vector in Λ⊥
q (A).
The SIS problem was first introduced in by Ajtai in his seminal work [2]. He
proved that solving the SIS problem can be reduced to solving certain worstcase problems in lattices. Then Miciancio and Regev [17] gave a more tighten
√
reduction saying that for large enough q, solving SIS as hard as solving Õ(β n)SIVP problem in all lattices in dimension n.
Definition 2 (Discrete Gaussian Distribution, Definition 4.2 of [15]).
The discrete Gaussian distribution over Zm centered at some v ∈ Zm with stanm
m
m
m
(x) := ρm
dard deviation σ is defined as Dv,σ
v,σ (x)/ρv,σ (Z ), where ρv,σ (x) :=

m −kx−vk2
P
m
m
√ 1
and ρm
e 2σ2
v,σ (Z ) :=
x∈Zm ρv,σ (x).
2πσ 2
Some basic facts relating to the discrete Gaussian distribution are summarized
in the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Lemma 4.3 in [15]).
(i) For any k > 0, Pr[|z| > kσ, z ← Dσ1 ] ≤ 2e
m

−k2
2

,
2

r
− 2kvk
2 σ2

(ii) For any v ∈ Z , and any σ, r > 0 , Pr [|hx, vi| > r : x ← Dσm ] ≤ 2e

.

Remark 1. In Lemma 1(i), if k = 12 then |z| > 12σ with probability at most
2−100 . Similarly, in Lemma 1(ii), if we choose r = 12kvkσ then |hx, vi| ≥ 12kvkσ
with probability at most 2−100 .
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√
Lemma 2 (Lemma 4.4 in [15]). For any η > 0, we have Pr[kzk > ησ m, z ←
2
m
Dσm ] ≤ η m e 2 (1−η ) .
m

2

Remark 2. In Lemma 2, the function η m e 2 (1−η ) is decreasing either in m (if
η fixed) or in η (if m fixed). See Table 1 for example. Clearly we need η > 1
as small as possible. Hence, with typical large enough m, one usually chooses
η ∈ [1.1, 1.3].

m = 50
m = 100
m = 200
η = 1.1 0.61601
0.37947
0.14399
η = 1.3 0.01605
0.00026
0.00000007
η = 3 9.7 × 10−64 9.9 × 10−127 9.7 × 10−253
m

Table 1: Some specific values for η m e 2 (1−η

2

)

Lemma 3 h(Lemma 4.5 in [15]). For any v ∈ Zm , ifi σ = αkvk where α > 0,
2
m
(x) ≤ e12/α+1/(2α ) : x ← Dσm ≥ 1 − 2−100 .
we have Pr Dσm (x)/Dv,σ
m
(x)
Remark 3. In Lemma 3, if we choose, α = 12, i.e., σ = 12kvk then Dσm (x)/Dv,σ
1+1/288
−100
≤e
with probability at least 1 − 2
.

Definition 3 (Statistical Distance, Definition 8.5 in [16]). Let X and X 0
be two random variables over a countable
P set S. We define the statistical distance
between X and X 0 by ∆(X, X 0 ) := 21 x∈S | Pr[X = x] − Pr[X 0 = x]|.
Lemma 4 (Triangular Inequality). Let X1 , X2 and X3 be three random
variables over a countable set S. We have ∆(X1 , X3 ) ≤ ∆(X1 , X2 ) + ∆(X2 , X3 ).
Lemma 5 (Rejection Sampling, Theorem 4.6 in [15]).
√ Given a subset
V = {v ∈ Zm : kvk ≤ T } and a real number σ = ω(T log m). Define on V
a probability distribution h : V → R. Then there exists a universal upper bound
M = O(1) such that the outputs of the following two algorithms A and B have
a negligible statistical distance of ∆(A, B) := 2−ω(log m) /M :
D m (z,)
, 1).
v,σ (z)

m
1. (A): v ← h, z ← Dv,σ
, output (z, v) with probability min( M Dσm

2. (B): v ← h, z ← Dσm , output (z, v) with probability 1/M .
Moreover, the probability that A outputs something is at least (1−2−ω(log m) )/M .
2
Particularly, if σ = αT for any α > 0 then M = e12/α+1/(2α ) , ∆(A, B) =
2−100 /M , and the probability that A outputs something is at least (1−2−100 )/M .
In order to construct the blind ring signature, we exploit the trapdoor
technique proposed in [8, Subsection 5.3] to generate necessary keys.
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TrapGen(1n ). The algorithm on input the security parameter n, chooses a
prime q = poly(n) and an integer m > 5n log q to output a matrix A ∈ Zn×m
q
and BA ∈ Zm×m
with kB̃A k ≤ K := m1+ for any  > 0, where the distribution
q
of A is statistically close to the uniform over Zn×m
and the matrix BA is a good
q
m
basis of the lattice Λ⊥
(A)
=
{v
∈
Z
:
Av
=
0
(mod
q)}.
q
We generalize the trapdoor inversion algorithm SampleISIS in [8, Subsection
5.3] to have the following algorithm:
, BA ∈
SampleKey(A, BA , σ, T). The algorithm takes as input A ∈ Zn×m
q
√
m×m
n
Zq
outputted by TrapGen(1 ), a real number σ ≥ K · ω( log n) and matrix
T ∈ Zqn×k , and returns a random (column) matrix
S ∈ Zm×k such that the
√
m
j-th column S[j] ∈ D = {s ∈ Z : ksk ≤ σ m} for all j ∈ [k] and that
AS = T (mod q) with overwhelming probability. The distribution of S[j] for all
m
j ∈ [k] is DZ,σ
statistically close to the uniform distribution over D.
In this work, we also exploit the commitment function com maps a pair of
two strings (µ,t) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n (called committed string) to a commitment
string C := com(µ, t) ∈ {0, 1}n to hide the value of the message µ. For security
goal, we need com to have two properties: statistically hiding and computationally binding. The first property ensures that any computationally unbounded
algorithm is not able to statistically distinguish two commitment strings C and
C 0 obtained from two distinct committed pairs (µ, t) 6= (µ0 , t0 ). The second property says that given a commitment string C obtained from the committed pair
of strings (µ, t) (i.e., C := com(µ, t)), no polynomia-time algorithm can find
another pair (µ0 , t0 ) with µ0 6= µ such that C = com(µ0 , t0 ). See [11, 13, 20] for
more details.

3

Blind Ring Signature Schemes

A blind ring signature consists of four algorithms called Setup, KeyGen, Sign and
Verify.
– Setup(1λ ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input
the security parameter λ and outputs a set of public parameters P.
– KeyGen(P) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input
the set of public parameters P to output a pair of public key (verification
key) and secret key (signing key) (pk, sk) corresponding to a signer of the
ring R = {S1 , · · · , Sl }. We denote the set of public keys of the ring R by
P K.
– Sign(P, skj , µ, P K) is an interactive polynomial-time protocol of two parties:
one is a user and another is a ring of signers R = {S1 , · · · , Sl }. The user,
say U(P, P K, µ), chooses a message µ that is blinded as µ∗ before sending
µ∗ to the ring R to be signed. The ring R, in turn, will choose a member,
say Sj , who possess the secret key skj , written Sj (P, skj ), as the real signer
interacting with the user. Finally, the signer obtains the blinded signature
Σ ∗ on µ∗ and outputs his view, denoted V, (it may that V 6= Σ ∗ ), while the
user will output the real (or final ) signature Σ on the original message µ by
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un-blinding Σ ∗ . The user may get an invalid signature denoted by a failure
symbol ⊥.
– Verify(P, µ, Σ, P K) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which takes
as input the set of common parameters P, the set of public keys P K, the
message µ and the signature Σ on µ, then outputs 1 if the signature is valid
and 0 otherwise.
A blind ring signature scheme must have the following properties: Correctness, Anonymity, Blindness and One-more Unforgeability. We will make these
properties clearer below.
Correctness. Correctness requires that the verifier always outputs 1 if it receives a valid signature. Formally, it must hold that
Pr[Verify(P, µ, Σ, P K) = 1 : Σ ← Sign(P, skj , µ, P K), Σ 6= ⊥] = 1.
A relaxation for the correctness is that if Σ ← Sign(P, skj , µ, P K), Σ 6= ⊥
then Verify(P, µ, Σ, P K) = 1 with overwhelming probability. (In our case the
probability will be at least 1 − 2−100 .)
Anonymity. The anonymity property ensures that a user is impossible to know
which member of the ring was the true signer engaging in the blind ring signature
protocol. The definition of the anonymity property is given in the game below.
In this game, the attacker acts as a malicious user.
1. Setup. The adversary A outputs the set of common parameters P, the ring
of signers R = {S1 , · · · , Sl }, its public keys P K, two distinct indexes j,
i1 ∈ [l], two secret keys skj , ski1 and a message µ. They are sent to the
challenger C.
2. Challenge. The challenger C chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then runs
Sign on the input (P, skib , µ, P K) to get a blinded signature Σi∗b on µ. The
blinded signature Σi∗b will be given to the adversary A.
3. Output. The adversary outputs a bit b0 as a guess of b. He wins the game
if b0 = b.
We say that the blind ring signature achieves anonymity if any adversary A
succeeds in guessing b with probability negligibly close to 1/2. In other words,
the advantage of A in distinguishing Σj and Σi1 is negligible.
Blindness. Blindness is a fundamental property of a blind ring signature saying
that all members in the ring do not learn any information about the message
received from the user that they are having to sign. The property can be modelled
as a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. In this game, the adversary
A plays the role of a dishonest ring of signers R who tries to differentiate two
given messages to know which one is being signed.
1. Setup. The adversary A chooses a security parameter λ and chooses a universal set of signers to generate the ring R∗ = {S1 , · · · , SL }. Then it calls
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Algorithm 1 BRS.Setup(1n )
Input: Security parameter n.
Output: The set of public parameters P=(n, m, q, k, κ, σ, H, σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , M1 , M2 ,
M3 , T, η)
1: Generate parameters as in Table 2
2: An one-way and collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k :
kck1 ≤ κ}
3: A commonly-used matrix T ←$ Zq m×k
4: Output all as the set P

Algorithm 2 BRS.KeyGen (P)
Input: P=(n, m, q, k, κ, σ, H, σ1 , σ2 , σ3 , M1 , M2 , M3 , T, η)
Output: A key pair (A, S)
1: Run TrapGen(1n ) to get A ∈ Zn×m
and BA ∈ Zqn×m is a trapdoor of A; /* the
q
distribution of A is statistically close to the uniform over Zn×m
*/
q
2: S ← SampleKey(A, BA , σ, T), i.e., AS = T (mod q) where S ∈ Dd :=
√
m×k
{−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d}m×k , d = σ m; /* the distribution of S is DZ,σ
statistically
close to the uniform over Dd */
3: return Public key A and secret key S

Setup(1λ ) to get the set of public parameters P according to the security
parameter λ and KeyGen(P) to output the key pairs (pki , ski )i∈[L] for each
signer Si , i ∈ [L]. The adversary A knows P and (pki , ski )i∈[L] .
2. Challenge. The adversary A chooses a subring R ⊂ R∗ , and its corresponding public keys P K, and two messages µ0 6= µ1 , then he sends them to the
challenger C. The challenger C will flip a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and sets up a blind
ring signature protocol taking µb and the ring R as input. The adversary
A chooses a signer Sj in the ring R to sign the hidden form of µb and acts
as the signer in the protocol. Eventually, A gets the view Vb and also the
“unblinded” signature Σb 6= ⊥. If Σb = ⊥, the game is restarted.
3. Guess. The adversary A outputs one value b0 ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary wins
the game if b0 = b.
We say that a ring signature scheme is blind if for any adversary A the success probability in the game is only negligibly larger than 1/2.
One-more Unforgeability. The one-more unforgeability property guarantees
that from at most qS real interactions of the blind ring signature protocol, the
user has no capacity of producing qS + 1 valid and different ring signatures.
The property is defined by the game below. In this game, the forger will act the
behaviour of a malicious user.
1. Setup. The forger F chooses a security parameter λ and chooses a universal
set of signers to generate the ring R∗ = {S1 , · · · , SL }. The challenger C calls
Setup(1λ ) to get the set of public parameters P and KeyGen(P) to output
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the key pairs (pki , ski )i∈[L] for each signer Si , i ∈ [L]. Then C sends to the
forger F the set P and the set of public keys {pki }i∈[L] . The set {ski }i∈[L]
is kept secret.
2. Queries. The forger F adaptively makes queries to the challenger:
– qH hash queries to the random oracle which models the hash function
H in the real protocol. For each hash query from the adversary, the
challenger has to reply with a consistently random value.
– qS blind signing queries, each is of the form (µi , Ri ) where Ri ⊂ R∗ . For
each signing query, the challenger must answer with a valid blind ring
signature.
3. Output. The forger F outputs qS + 1 tuples {(µi , Ri , Σi )}i∈[qS +1] , Ri ⊂ R∗ .
He wins the game if {Σi }i∈[qS +1] are all valid and (µi , Ri ) 6= (µj , Rj ) for all
i, j ∈ [qS + 1] and i 6= j.
We say that a blind ring signature scheme is one-more unforgeable if in the game,
Pr[F wins] is negligible.
Remark 4. For simplicity, in the proof for the one-more unforgeability property
of our proposed scheme, we assume that Ri = R∗ for all i ∈ [qS + 1], that is, the
forger does not want to change the ring of signers at all.

4

Our Blind Ring Signature Scheme

We will present our blind ring signature (named BRS) scheme. The security
of BRS bases on the average-case assumption of the SIS problem. The scheme
follows the 4-move framework for blind ring signature as reviewed in Section 3.
It consists of four algorithms (see Algorithms 1-3 and Figure 1) described as
follows:
– We suppose that n is the security parameter. BRS.Setup(1n ) is called to
output a common set of parameters P (see Algorithm 1). We will mention
the role of these parameters and how to set them in Subsection 6.
– Given a matrix T ←$ Zq n×k , to generate public key Ai ←$ Zq n×m and
secret key Si ∈ Zq m×k for each signer Si in a ring R = {S1 , · · · , Sl } of
l members such that T = Ai Si , we run l times BRS.KeyGen (see Algorithm 2) which exploits the preimage sample functions (trapdoor functions)
mentioned in Subsection 2. The secret key Si follows a discrete Gaussian distribution Dσm×k and its security is guaranteed by the hardness assumption
of the ISIS problem.
– The signing algorithm (BRS.Sign)(see Figure 1) is an interactive protocol
between a user U and a ring R = {S1 , · · · , Sl }. The user U knows the set
of public keys P K and he wants the ring R to sign the message µ. Here we
describe the protocol in the case that the ring secretly delegates some signer
Sj ∈ R to interact with the user. We relatively split the signing interaction
into five main phases:

A Blind Ring Signature Based on SIS

The member Sj (P, Sj ) is the signer
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The user U(P, P K, µ)

Phase 1:
for P
i ∈ [l]: si ←$ Dσm2
x = i∈[l] Ai si (mod q)
x −→Phase 2:
for i ∈ [l]: ai ← Dσm3
b←P
Dσk1 , t ←$ {0, 1}n ,
w = i∈[l] Ai ai , C := com(µ, t)
u = x + w + Tb (mod q)
c = H(u, C, P K), e = c + b
Outputs e withprobability

min

k
Dσ
(e)
1

k
M1 ·Dc,σ
(e)

,1

1

←−e

Phase 3:
for i ∈ [l] \ {j}: yi = si
for j: yj = sj + Sj e
Output yj 
with probability 
m
(yj )
Dσ
2
min M2 ·Dm
,1
(yj )
Sj e,σ2

Σ ∗ = {yi }i∈[l]−→Phase 4:
for i ∈ [l]: zi = yi + ai
accepts zi with
probability o
n
min

m
Dσ
(zi )
3

m
M3 ·Dy
,σ (zi )
i

Phase 5:
if (result 6= accept):
ParseP
result= ((ai )i∈[l]P
, b, c, C)
w = i∈[l] Ai ai , v = i∈[l] Ai yi
u = x + w + Tb (mod q)
u0 = w + v − Tc (mod q)
if ( e − b = c = H(u, C, P K)
and c = H(u0 , C, P K)
√
and ∃j s.t. kyj + aj k > ησ3 m) :
Restart the protocol
Output: the view V = (x, e, (si , yi )i∈[l] )

,1

3

That is,
√
if (∃j s.t. kzj k > ησ3 m) :
result := ((ai )i∈[l] , b, c, C)
else: result := accept
Output: (µ, Σ = ((zi )i∈[l] , c, t))
or ⊥ when result 6= accept
←− result

Fig. 1: The signing protocol BRS.Sign( P, Sj , µ, P K), j ∈ [l], P K = {Ai }i∈[l]
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• Phase 1: The signer samples randomly a list {si }i∈[l] according to the
distribution
Dσm2 to compute and then sends the commitment x =
P
i∈[l] Ai si to the user.
• Phase 2: The user chooses blind factors ai ← Dσm3 for all i ∈ [l] and
b ← Dσk1 . He also chooses a random binary vector t ←$ {0, 1}n then uses
the commitment function com to compute the commitment
string C :=
P
com(µ, t) ∈ {0, 1}n . Afterward, he computes u = x + i∈[l] Ai ai + Tb
then hash it with C using the hash function H where H : {0, 1}∗ →
Dc := {c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k : kck1 ≤ κ} to get the challenge c. To blind
the message, the user uses the rejection sampling technique to get the
blinded challenge e. Finally, the user sends e to the ring.
• Phase 3: This is the signing phase in which the signer Sj considers si ’s
sampled in Phase 1 as the partial signatures of other members in the
ring on the message µ, while he uses his secret key Sj to compute his
himself partial signature yj = sj + Sj e on µ. In order to make sure that
no information of his secret key Sj is leaked, the signer also exploits the
rejection sampling such that yj follows the same distribution Dσm2 as sj .
Finally, he sends the blinded signature {yi }i∈[l] to the user.
• Phase 4: In this phase, the user computes zi = yi + ai for all i ∈ [l].
The rejection sampling is used
√ here to ensure that zi is independent of
yi for blindness. If kzi k ≤ η mσ3 for all i ∈ [l] then the user outputs
(µ, Σ = ((zi )i∈[l] , c, t)) as the final signature; otherwise, he returns “⊥”.
Note that, it is a must for the user to send result to the signer as a
confirmation of the validity of the final signature (if result := accept ) or
as a requirement to restart the protocol (if result := ((ai )i∈[l] , b, c, C)).
• Phase 5: In this phase, if the signer gets result 6= accept, he will check
up some conditions before he restarts the protocol from the beginning.
This helps to detect the case that an adversarial user tries to restart the
signing protocol despite having obtained a valid signature. If the signer
gets the validity confirmation from the user, he finally outputs the view
V = (x, e, (si , yi )i∈[l] ).
√
– BRS.Verify(P,
µ, Σ, P K) = 1 iff kzi k ≤ η mσ3 for all i ∈ [l] and c =
P
H( i∈[l] Ai zi −Tc (mod q), com(µ, t), P K); and BRS.Verify(P, µ, Σ, P K) =
0 otherwise. (See Algorithm 3.)

5
5.1

Correctness and Security Analysis of BRS
Correctness

Theorem 1 (Correctness). Our BRS scheme is correct after at most e2 repetitions with probability at least 1 − 2−100 .
Proof (of Theorem 1). Given the pair (µ, Σ = ((zi )i∈[l] , c, t)) is the output of
the user in BRS.Sign(P, Sj , µ, P K) as in Figure 1, the set of public keys P K =
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Algorithm 3 BRS.Verify(P, µ, Σ, P K)
Input: P, µ, Σ = ((zi )i∈[l] , c, t), P K = {Ai }i∈[l]
Output:
P 1 or 0
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

u = i∈[l] Ai zi − Tc (mod q)
c0 = H(u, com(µ, t), P K)
√
if c0 = c and kzi k ≤ η mσ3 for all i ∈ [l] then
return 1
else
return 0
end if

P
{Ai }i∈[l] , and parameters P, we will prove that H( i∈[l] Ai zi − Tc (mod q),
com(µ, t), P K) = c.
Without caring the restarts appear in rejection samplings, we have
X
X
Ai zi − Tc (mod q) =
Ai (yi + ai ) − T(e − b) (mod q)
i∈[l]

i∈[l]

=

X

Ai si + Aj (sj + Sj e)

i∈[l]\{j}

+

X

Ai ai − T(e − b) (mod q)

i∈[l]

=

X
i∈[l]

Ai s i +

X

Ai ai + Tb (mod q)

i∈[l]

= x + w + Tb (mod q).
P
Hence H( i∈[l] Ai zi − Tc (mod q), com(µ, t), P K) = c. Note that, with
√
overwhelming probability, kzi | ≤ η mσ3 for all i ∈ [l] by Lemma 2.
Now we analyze the rejection sampling technique to bound the number of
restarts of our BRS protocol. Recall that, by Remark 3, we have
e1+1/288
Dσm (x)
≤
,
m
M · Dv,σ (x)
M
with probability at least 1 − 2−100 if σ = 12kvk. Being used in the rejection
m
sampling, we need Dσm (x)/(M · Dv,σ
(x)) ≤ 1. Since M should be as small as

possible, it is sufficient to choose M = exp (24kvkσ + kvk2 )/(2σ 2 ) ≈ e1+1/288 ,
with σ = 12kvk. Now we apply above analyses to the rejection samplings in
our BRS scheme. Remark that in Phase 2 of our scheme, as the user utilizes the
rejection sampling locally to output e, the restarts of this phase does not impact
to the correctness of the scheme. We just care about the restarts happening in
Phase 3 and Phase 5. Hence, after at most M2 ·M3 ≈ e2 restarts, the BRS scheme
can successfully output a valid blind ring signature.
t
u
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Remark 5. In the proof of Theorem 1, we use e = c + b obtained in Phase 2 of
BRS.Sign. Assume that e = c0 + b0 for some b 6= b0 , c 6= c0 , then also
X

Ai zi − Tc0 (mod q) =

i∈[l]

X

Ai (yi + ai ) − T(e − b0 ) (mod q)

i∈[l]

= x + w + Tb0 (mod q).
P
Thus, if e−b0 = c0 = H(x+w+Tb0 (mod q), com(µ, t), P K), then H( i∈[l] Ai zi
−Tc0 (mod q), com(µ, t), P K) = c0 . This remark will be used in the proof of
Theorem 4.

5.2

Anonymity

Recall that, in the anonymity game (see Subsection 3), the adversary A receives
a set of public keys P K = {pki }i∈[l] and he adaptively make queries to the blind
ring signature with a message µ and the indexes j, i1 ∈ [l] to get a signature
Σ which depends on the random bit b ∈ {0, 1} chosen by the challenger. The
adversary wins the game if he guesses exactly the bit b. The following theorem
says that the advantage of the attacker in guessing b is actually negligible.
Theorem 2 (Anonymity). Given the ring of signers R = {S1 , · · · , Sl }, and
the set of key pairs {(Ai , Si )}i∈[l] , a message µ, two distinct indexes j, i1 ∈ [l]
and a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Consider the anonymity game as in Subsection 3.
Let X0 and X1 two random variables representing the blinded signatures obtained
by the blind ring signature protocol BRS.Sign with respect to b = 0 and b = 1,
respectively. Then there exist a universal constant M2 > 0 such that
∆(X0 , X1 ) ≤

21−ω(log m)
.
M2

Proof (of Theorem 2). In the game, the challenger chooses randomly b ∈ {0, 1}
and runs BRS.Sign using the signer Sib corresponding to the private key Sib ,
then we will get the blinded signature (y1 , · · · , yib · · · , yl ), where yib := Sib e +
sib outputted with probability min{Dσm2 (yib )/(M2 · DSmi e,σ2 (yib )), 1} and yi :=
b
si ← Dσm2 for all i ∈ [l] \ {ib }.
Assume that the adversary gets the signature (y1 , · · · , yib · · · , yl ) by choosing each element yi from Dσm2 with probability 1/M2 . We denote by Y the random
variable according to the signature obtained by this way. Then using Lemma 5
we have
2−ω(log m)
2−ω(log m)
and ∆(X1 , Y ) ≤
.
∆(X0 , Y ) ≤
M2
M2
Hence ∆(X0 , X1 ) ≤ ∆(X0 , Y ) + ∆(X1 , Y ) ≤

21−ω(log m)
M2

still negligible.

t
u
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Blindness

Theorem 3 (Blindness). Our BRS scheme is blind provided that com is hiding
and the hash function H is one-way.
Proof (of Theorem 3). It is easy to see that the blindness of our BRS scheme is
guaranteed by the rejection sampling technique and the hiding property of the
commitment com.
As per the game of blindness in Subsection 3, when the dishonest signer gives
two messages µ0 and µ1 to the challenger, the challenger will chooses randomly
a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then the signer and the challenger initiates the blind ring
signature protocol having interaction with only one of two users U(P, P K, µ0 )
and U(P, P K, µ1 ). We show that the signer actually does not know which user
he is interacting with, that is, the view V = (x, e, (si , yi )i∈[l] ) that the signer has
is independent of the message being signed. More precisely, e and (yi )i∈[l] ) is
independent of the message being signed. Indeed, let V0 = (x0 , e0 , (s0,i , y0,i )i∈[l] )
and V1 = (x1 , e1 , (s1,i , y1,i )i∈[l] ) be views respectively corresponding to users
U(P, P K, µ0 ) and U(P, P K, µ1 ). Then, the rejection sampling in Phase 2 ensures
that both e0 and e1 are distributed according to the same distribution Dσk1 .
Similarly, by the rejection sampling in Phase 3, both y0,i and y1,j for all i, j ∈ [l]
follow the same distribution Dσm2 . The distributions of e and y0,i are independent
of choosing the message to be signed.
Regarding two unblinded signatures Σ0 = ((zb,i )i∈[l] , cb , tb ) corresponding
to the users U(P, P K, µb ), b = 0, 1. Again, by the rejection sampling used in
Phase 4, the malicious signer is impossible to distinguish (z0,i )i∈[l] from (z1,i )i∈[l] .
Certainly, the signer does not learn anything about the original message µ being
signed from the challenges c0 , c1 due to the property of the hash function H.
Also, the distribution of tb is independent of µ.
Finally, we concern the restart might happen in Phase 5. Again, by the hiding
property of the commitment com and since the user samples fresh values t, a
and b after every such a restart, we have that each rerun of the protocol is
independent of the previous runs. (See similar arguments to a blind signature
scheme in [20].)
t
u
5.4

One-more Unforgeability

Before stating the main theorem of this subsection, we adopt the following
lemma:
Lemma 6 (Lemma 5.2 in [15]). Given a matrix A ∈ Zn×m
where m >
q
64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1), randomly chosen s ←$ {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d}m . Then with
probability at least 1 − 2−100 , there exists another s0 ←$ {−d, · · · , 0, · · · , d}m
such that As = As0 (mod q).
For notational convenience, we call the (qH , qS , δ)-forger F a polynomialtime algorithm F that successfully breaks the one-more unforgeablity of our BRS
protocol with non negligible probability δ, making at most qH hash queries and
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at most qS sign queries to the scheme. The following theorem says that if there
exists such a forger then one can construct an algorithm being able to solve an
SIS problem.
Theorem 4 (One-more Unforgeability). Consider the BRS scheme described
in Section 4. Suppose that the commitment function com used in the BRS scheme
is binding. If there is a (qH , qS , δ)-forger F who breaks the one-more unforgeablity of our BRS protocol then there is a polynomial-time algorithm
G which
√ √
κ)
m,
(2lησ
can solve
an
SIS
problem
with
β
=
max{(2lησ
+
2σ
3 +
q,n,ml,β
3
√
lησ2 ) m} with probability at least
! 
(


)
δ − |D1c |
1
1
1
1
(1 − ζ) 1 −
−
,δ 1 −
,
δoverall ≥ min
4s
|Dc |
qH
|Dc |
|Dc |
where ζ is the probability of a restart in the scheme, s := qS + 1.
Proof (of Theorem 4).
In the following, we will describe an algorithm G using F as a black-box
routine to solve the following SISq,n,ml,β problem:
Find kb
zk ≤ β such that Ab
z = 0 (mod q), where A := [A1 k · · · kAl ].

(2)

1. Setup. First of all, G calls BRS.Setup(1n ) to get a set of public parameters
P, but without T. This T will be produced by G later, as below. G then forms
a set of signers to generate the ring of signers R = {S1 , · · · , Sl } in which each
signer Si is uniquely identified by the matrix Ai . Next, G chooses randomly
an index j ←$ {1, · · · , l} in order for G, when necessary (e.g., to reply
signing queries made by F), to play the role of Sj . Afterwards, G samples
m×k
Sj ← DZ,σ
and sets T := Aj Sj (mod q) and adds T to P. Finally, G sends
to the forger F the set P and the set of public keys P K := {Ai }i∈[l] . The
matrix Sj will be kept as a secret key.
2. Queries. The forger F adaptively makes qH hash queries to the random
oracle which models the hash function H in the real protocol and qS blind
signing queries. The algorithm G creates and maintains a list LH consisting
of random oracle queries (u, C) ←$ Znq ×{0, 1}∗ and their corresponding hash
value c ∈ Dc , where Dc := {c : c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}k , kck1 ≤ κ}. Furthermore, G
randomly preselects R := {r1 , · · · , rqH } ←$ Dc as a set of replies of H and
also chooses a random tape ρ. The solver G runs F(P, P K, ρ) as a black-box
routine as follows:
– Random Oracle Queries. Whenever G receives a query (u, C), it will
check whether the query is in the list LH or not. If yes, G sends the
corresponding hash value c to the forger F. Otherwise, G opts the first
unused ri , i ∈ [qH ] from R, assigns c := ri , stores the query-hash value
pair ((u, C), c) in LH and sends c to the forger.
– Signing Queries. The forger F plays the role of the user, processing
qS times the interactive blind ring signature protocol, while the solver
G acts as the signer of the ring. If F wants to have the signature of a
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message µ, the solver G will plays the role of the signer Sj and runs the
BRS.Sign algorithm in Figure 1 to produce the required signature using
the matrix Sj as the secret key in Phase 3.
3. Output. After at most qS signing queries, with non-negligible probability
δ, the forger F eventually outputs s := qS + 1 blind ring signatures
(µ1 , (z1,i )i∈[l] , c1 , t1 ), · · · , (µs , (zs,i )i∈[l] , cs , ts ),
where µ1 , · · · , µs are s distinct messages. At the moment, the algorithm G
predicts randomly an index k ∈ [s] satisfying that ck = ri for some i ∈ [qH ].
Afterward, G samples new fresh random oracle answers {r0i , · · · , r0qH } ←$ Dc
and then invokes F(P, P K, ρ) again with R0 := {r1 , · · · , ri−1 , r0i , · · · , r0qH }.
Among other values, the forger F outputs (µ0 k , (z0k,i )i∈[l] , c0k , t0k ). If ck 6= c0k
then G returns
((zk,i )i∈[l] − Sj ck , (z0k,i )i∈[l] − Sj c0k ) for all j ∈ [l],
in order to solve the SIS problem. If ck = c0k , the solver G retries F(P, P K, ρ0 )
s
times with a different random tape ρ0 .
at most qH
Analysis. The environment of F is perfectly simulated by G since the dism×k
tribution of the matrix T, which is generated by sampling Sj ← DZ,σ
with
sufficiently large σ then and computing T := Aj Sj (mod q), is close to uniform
(see [8, lemma 5.2] for more details). Moreover, rejection sampling is exploited
before outputting yj (in Phase 3) then yj is independent of Sj , thus F learns
no information about Sj from receiving yj . Therefore, the restarts happen with
the same probability ζ as in the real scheme. Obviously, there is at least one
signature not coming from a real interaction. The algorithm G guesses correctly
the index of this signature with probability at least 1/s. And ck is a random
oracle answer with probability 1/|Dc |. Note that, with probability 1/2, there is
at least one of the reruns of F gives the same index pair (i, k) such that ri = ck .
Therefore, we can assume that the index pairs in two runs are the same.
Applying the forking lemma [3, Lemma 3.1] with noting that restarts happen
with probability ζ, we have that F is again successful in breaking the one-more
unforgeability and outputs one more new signature (µ0 k , (z0k,i )i∈[l] , c0k , t0k ) with
probability δf rk ≥ (1 − ζ)(δ − 1/|Dc |)((δ − 1/|Dc |)/qH − 1/|Dc |) using the same
random oracle query as in the first run. Thus we have
X
X
(
Ai zk,i −Tck (mod q), com(µk , tk )) = (
Ai z0k,i −Tc0k (mod q), com(µ0k , t0k )).
i∈[l]

i∈[l]

Since then, we have that
X
X
Ai zk,i − Tck (mod q) =
Ai z0k,i − Tc0k (mod q).
i∈[l]

i∈[l]

Equivalently,
X
i∈[l]

Ai (zk,i − z0k,i ) + T(c0k − ck ) = 0 (mod q).

(3)
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Plugging T = Aj Sj (mod q) into Eq. (3), we have
X

Ai (zk,i − z0k,i ) + Aj (zk,j − z0k,j + Sj (c0k − ck )) = 0 (mod q).

(4)

i∈[l]\{j}

Set the matrix
A := [A1 k · · · kAj−1 kAj kAj+1 k · · · kAl ],
and
b
z :=[zk,1 − z0k,1 , · · · , zk,j−1 − z0k,j−1 , zk,j − z0k,j + Sj (c0k − ck ),
zk,j+1 − z0k,j+1 , · · · , zk,l − z0k,l ],
from Equation (4) we have Ab
z = 0 (mod q).
The next step is to prove that b
z 6= 0 with probability non- negligible. In
fact, by Lemma 6, there is another secret key S0 j such that ASj = AS0j (mod q)
in which Sj and Sj have all the same columns but the i-th column with i is
the position that ck [i] 6= c0k [i]. Clearly, if zk,j − z0k,j + Sj (c0k − ck ) = 0 then
zk,j − z0k,j + S0j (c0k − ck ) 6= 0. Thus with probability at least 1/2 we get b
z 6= 0.
√
√
√
Note that kzk,i k ≤ ησ3√ m, kSi k ≤ σ m and kck k ≤ κ for all i ∈ [l].
Hence,
√ √
kzk,i − z0 k,i k ≤ 2ησ3 m for all i ∈ [l],. Thus, kb
zk ≤ (2lησ3 + 2σ κ) m.
Therefore, we have the success probability of G in solving the SIS problem (2)
in this case is at least
δsolve ≥

1
1
δf rk ≥ (1 − ζ)(δ − 1/|Dc |)((δ − 1/|Dc |)/qH − 1/|Dc |).
4s
4s

Now, taking restarts happen in Phase 5 into account, we will show that if the
adversarial user can forge a valid signature through a Phase 5 restart help, then
G can solve the SIS problem stated in Equation (2). To trigger a restart in Phase
5, the forger sends to the signer result:= ((ai )i∈[l] , b, c, C) which, together with
the view of the signer V = (x, e, (si , yi )i∈[l] ), satisfies all the following conditions:
e − b = c = H(x + w + Tb (mod q), C, P K),

(5)

c = H(w + v − Tc (mod q), C, P K),
(6)
√
(7)
kyj + aj k > ησ3 m for some j ∈ [l],
P
P
P
where x =
i∈[l] Ai si , w =
i∈[l] Ai ai , v =
i∈[l] Ai yi . Assume that the
adversary can obtain a valid signature Σ ∗ = ((z0i )i∈[l] , c0 , t0 ) (with probability
at least δ) from this restart. That is, for some b0 ∈ Dσk1 such that e = c0 + b0 we
have,
e − b0 = c0 = H(x + w + Tb0 (mod q), C, P K),
X
c0 = H(
Ai z0i − Tc0 (mod q), com(µ, t0 ), P K),

(8)
(9)

i∈[l]

√
kz0i k ≤ ησ3 m for all i ∈ [l].

(10)
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With probability 1−1/|Dc | (how to compute this probability, see [10, Subsection
4.6.1 in Chapter 4])), we have c0 = c. Then by Equation (6) and Equation (9),
we have
X
w + v (mod q) =
Ai z0i (mod q).
i∈[l]

That is,
X

Ai (ai + yi ) (mod q) =

i∈[l]

X

Ai z0i (mod q).

i∈[l]

Define
b
z :=[a1 + y1 − z01 , · · · , al + yl − z0l ].
We have Ab
z = 0√(mod q). If b
z = 0, i.e., ai + yi = z0i for all i ∈ [l], then we have
kyi + ai k ≤ ησ3 m for all i ∈ [l] (due to Equation (10)) which√contradicts with
Equation (7). Hence, b
z 6= 0 and we have kb
zk ≤ (2lησ3 + lησ2 ) m. The success
probability of G in case the forger can get a valid signature through a restart is
δrestart ≥ δ(1 − 1/|Dc |).
To sum up, we have proven that with overall success probability of δoverall ≥
min(δsolve , δrestart ), the solver G can solve the SISq,n,ml,β problem where
√ √
√
β = max((2lησ3 + 2σ κ) m, (2lησ3 + lησ2 ) m).

6

Parameter Setting

Basically, parameters in this work are set in a similar way to [27]. We need parameters n, q, k to make sure that the SIS problem is computationally infeasible
to keep secret keys Si ’s not to be recovered. To generate the key pairs, we invoke the trapdoor
functions using the discrete Gaussian distribution Dσ with
√
σ ≥ L · ω( log n) and L = m1+ for any  > 0.
For security proofs, we need m ≥ 64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1) via Lemma 6. We
also need m ≥ 5n log q for TrapGen works. So we can choose m ≥ max{64 +
n · log q/ log(2d + 1), 5n log q}. The parameter
κ appearing in the hash function

H should be chosen to satisfy 2κ · κk ≥ 2100 in order to guarantee that the
min-entropy of H is at least 100. As analyzed in Subsection 5.1, we can√set
Mi := e1+1/288 for all i √
∈ [3]. Accordingly,
we then set σ1 = 12kck = √
12 κ,
√
σ2 = 12kS√
j ek = 12σησ1 mk = 144ση mkκ and σ3 = 12kyi k = 12ησ2 m =
1728mη 2 σ kκ.
The real signature is Σ = ((zi )i∈[l] , c, t)). Each component of zi is of length
at most 12σ3 with probability at least 1 − 2−100 by Lemma 1, so the signature
bit-size is lm log(12σ3 ) + n + κ bits. The secret key bit-size is lmk log(2d + 1).
The public key bit-size is (lnm + nk) log q.
The parameter setting is summarized in Table2.
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Parameters

Requirement

Description

n
–
security parameter
l
–
number of ring members
q
poly(n), prime
modulo
m
max(64 + n log q/ log(2d + 1), 5n log q) in Lemma 6, TrapGen
K
m1+ , for any
in SampleKey
√ >0
σ
≥ K · ω( log n)
in SampleKey
√
d
σ· m
in BRS.KeyGen
k and κ
such that 2κ · κk ≥ 2100
in the hash function H
η
[1.1, 1.3]
in Lemma 2
M1 = M2 = M3
exp(1 + 1/288)
√
σ1
12 √
κ
in the rejection sampling
σ2
12σησ1 mk
√
σ3
12ησ2 m
signature size
lm log(12σ3 ) + n + κ bits
secret key size
lmk log(2d + 1) bits
public key size
(lnm + nk) log q bits

Table 2: Parameter setting for our BRS scheme

7

Conclusions and Future Works

In this paper, we proposed, for the first time, a lattice-based blind ring signature
scheme. Our scheme is proven to fulfill the anonymity and the blindness properties due to being constructed with the reject sampling technique . Moreover, the
scheme is one-more unforgeable in the random oracle model under the hardness
of SIS problem.
There have been several recent results in improving lattice-based (ring) signatures both on signature sizes and the hardness assumption (e.g. from module
lattices), which can be utilized to improve our scheme. We will leave to apply
these improvements as future works. One more interesting approach should be
our next work is to design a blind ring signature without using trapdoor functions but, for example, basing on the idea of [1]. Also, it is still open to construct
a blind ring signature that is secure in the standard model.
Acknowledgment. The first author would like to thank Prof. Masaya Yasuda for his financial support. The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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